Methods for the detection and characterisation of SARS-CoV-2 variants: second update, 21 June 2022

This document aims to provide interim guidance for microbiology and virology experts, other laboratory professionals, laboratory managers, infectious disease programme managers, public health professionals and other stakeholders that provide primary, confirmatory or advanced testing for SARS-CoV-2, including genomic sequencing, or are involved in making decisions on establishing or scaling up capability and capacity to detect and characterize circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants.

Operational considerations for respiratory virus surveillance in Europe, 18 July 2022

This document outlines operational considerations to support the continuity of national surveillance systems and public health laboratories for epidemiological and virological surveillance for influenza, SARS-CoV-2, and potentially other respiratory viruses (such as RSV or new viruses of public health concern) in the 2022/2023 winter season and beyond. It builds on previously published documents on COVID-19 and influenza surveillance. The intended audience for this document is those with national responsibility for influenza and COVID-19 surveillance in Europe.

COVID-19 contact tracing: country experiences and way forward: meeting report

Contact tracing has been a cornerstone of countries’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and it remains a key strategy for interrupting chains of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and reducing COVID-19-associated morbidity and mortality. Although the pandemic is not over, many countries are transitioning towards a more sustainable and integrated approach to the COVID-19 response. Contact tracing systems are adjusting and need to be adapted further to reflect this change in the long term. This meeting on COVID-19 Contact Tracing jointly organized by WHO/Europe and ECDC was held online on 1 March 2022. The meeting brought together COVID-19 Contact Tracing experts from 39 countries and territories from the WHO European Region, including 24 European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The full list of participating countries is in annex 1. The meeting focused on two key topics: (i) experiences, challenges and solutions related to COVID-19 contact tracing, and (ii) how contact tracing can be better integrated in health systems strengthening and pandemic preparedness planning moving forward. Two breakout sessions were organised to allow all countries the opportunity to actively engage in discussions related to topics above.

Methods for the detection and identification of SARS-CoV-2 variants, March 2021

Whole Genome Sequencing, or at least complete or partial S-gene, should be performed to confirm infection witha specific variant. For early detection and prevalence calculation of variants of concern (e.g. B.1.1.7/501Y.V1,B.1.351/501Y.V2, P.1/501Y.V3), alternative methods have been developed, such as diagnostic screening PCRbased assays. While testing strategies should be flexible and rapidly adaptable to change, depending on the localepidemiology, population dynamics and resources, sample and method selection are key and will depend on theobjectives. Specific objectives include the assessment of the circulation of the different SARS-CoV-2 variants inthe community selecting representative samples, genetic characterisation to monitor the virus evolution andinform vaccine composition decisions or outbreak analyses. When PCR-based assays are used, confirmatorysequencing of at least a subset of viruses should be performed to be able to use these assay results as indicatorsof community circulation of the variants of concern. Before introducing a new testing method or a new assay, avalidation and verification exercise should be carried out to ensure that the laboratory testing system isperforming adequately for the circulating viruses. Reporting the results to The European Surveillance System(TESSy) and the sequences to GISAID should be done in a timely manner (ideally weekly).This document was developed by technical experts from ECDC and WHO Regional Office for Europe with reviewby experts of the SARS-CoV-2 Characterisation Working Group.

ECDC: COVID-19

Página oficial del Centro Europeo para la Prevención y el Control de Enfermedades que contiene información actualizada sobre el nuevo coronavirus 2019, información epidemiológica y distribución global, evaluación actual del riesgo, preguntas más frecuentes, publicaciones, noticias, mapas, estadísticas, informes, folletos, enlaces de interés, etc.

Personal protective equipment (PPE) needs in healthcare settings for the care of patients with suspected or confirmed novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) = Equipo de protección personal necesario en centros sanitarios para el cuidado de pacientes infectados por el nuevo coronavirus 2019-nCoV o con sospecha de infección

Informe del ECDC dirigido a autoridades de Salud Pública y administradores de hospitales de países de la UE/EEE, cuyo objetivo es apoyar los planes de preparación de salud pública, relacionados con los equipos de protección personal en los centros sanitarios en los que se estén tratando a pacientes infectados por el nuevo coronavirus 2019-nCoV o en los que se sospecha la infección.

COVID-19 in Children and the Role of School Settings in COVID-19 Transmission

From the Background: "Although fewer than 5% of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] cases reported in EU/EEA [European Union/European Economic Area] countries and the UK have been in persons under 18 years of age, the role of children in SARS-CoV-2 [severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2] transmission remains unclear, especially in the context of educational settings. Available evidence to date indicates that children most probably contract COVID-19 in their households or through contact with infected family members, particularly in countries where school closures and strict physical distancing has been implemented. Following the declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic in early March, many EU/EEA countries and the UK began to close schools to limit the spread of the virus, despite limited evidence as to whether childcare and educational settings play a role in transmitting SARS-CoV-2. These decisions were based on what is known of the impact of pre-emptive early school closures on transmission of pandemic influenza. In recent months, Member States have adjusted policies on schools as the pandemic has progressed."

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the EU/EEA and the UK - Eleventh Update: Resurgence of Cases

From the Summary: "Since 31 December 2019 and as of 2 August 2020, 17 841 669 cases of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] have been reported worldwide, including 685 281 deaths. European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) have reported 1 733 550 cases (10% of all cases), including 182 639 deaths (27% of all deaths). The COVID-19 pandemic continues to pose a major public health threat to EU/EEA countries and the UK and to countries worldwide. As cases increased, peaking in early April 2020 in the EU/EEA, many countries implemented a range of response measures which led to a reduction in incidence. As countries regained control of transmission and alleviated the burden on healthcare, many measures were relaxed or removed to allow for a more viable way of life with the virus in circulation. Subsequently, a recent increase in COVID-19 cases has been reported in many EU/EEA countries. While many countries are now testing mild and asymptomatic cases, which has resulted in increased case reports, there is a true resurgence in cases in several countries as a result of physical distancing measures being relaxed."

COVID-19 Clusters and Outbreaks in Occupational Settings in the EU/EEA and the UK

From the Document: "The aim of this document is to describe COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] clusters and outbreaks in the EU/EEA [European Union/European Economic Area] and the UK linked to occupational settings, including healthcare and non-healthcare settings, and to identify possible factors contributing to transmission in these settings."

Objectives for COVID-19 Testing in School Settings

From the Objectives: "[1] To ensure early identification of cases among students and staff in order to conduct contact tracing and initiate prevention and control measures, thereby reducing further transmission. [2] To identify infection in students and staff at high risk of developing severe disease due to underlying conditions. [3] To support investigations and studies concerning the role of children in the transmission of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]."

COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety Protocol: Operational Guidelines for the Management of Air Passengers and Aviation Personnel in Relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic

From the General Considerations: The purpose of this COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] Aviation Health Safety Protocol is to provide guidance to airport operators, aircraft operators, and NCAs [national competent authorities], as well as other relevant authorities and stakeholders on how to facilitate the safe and gradual restoration of passenger air transport. This restoration is subject to the deployment of proportionate and effective measures that reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 [severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2] transmission at the airport and on board aircraft, as much as practicably possible, to protect the health of passengers and aviation personnel. The general situation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, including the implemented containment measures, the potential risk of being exposed to one or more infected individuals, and the need to deal with unfamiliar situations in the workplace, is likely to have a negative impact on the mental health and well-being of passengers and aviation personnel. In this context, airport operators, aircraft operators and, where applicable, other service providers/suppliers should promote aviation personnel's access to counselling and/or support programmes (where available), and make use of the World Health Organization, EU-OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Association] and any other relevant guidance.Air travel--Health aspects;Travel restrictions;COVID-19 (Disease)

Use of Gloves in Healthcare and Non-healthcare Settings in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic

From the Scope of this Document: This document aims to provide scientific evidence and guidance for healthcare settings and the public on using gloves as a preventive measure during the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic. Wearing gloves outside the context of COVID-19 for personal protection and mandated by relevant regulations in occupational settings such as in industrial applications or in the food or pharmaceutical industry to avoid contamination of products is outside the scope of this document.Protective clothing;COVID-19 (Disease);Public health

Resurgence of Reported Cases of COVID-19 in the EU/EEA, the UK and EU Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries

From the Document: Since 31 December 2019 and as of 30 June 2020, 10,273,001 cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have been reported worldwide, including 505,295 deaths. EU/EEA [European Economic Area] countries and the UK have reported 1,556,709 cases (15 % of all cases), including 176,800 deaths (35% of all deaths), while EU candidate and potential candidate countries reported 229,112 cases (2% of all cases), including 5,988 deaths (1% of all deaths). The COVID-19 pandemic is posing an unprecedented threat to EU/EEA countries and the UK as well as countries worldwide, many of which have been experiencing widespread transmission of the virus in the community for several months. There is still community transmission reported in most EU/EEA countries, the UK and EU candidate and potential candidate countries. Additionally, some countries are reporting a resurgence of observed cases or large localised outbreaks. [...] In this risk assessment, ECDC [European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control] is assessing the risks associated with these reported increases of incident cases in some countries.COVID-19 (Disease);Public health surveillance

Infection Prevention and Control and Surveillance for Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) in Prisons in EU/EEA Countries and the UK

From the Scope of the Document: This document provides principles of surveillance, infection prevention and control (IPC) and management of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] infection in prisons in European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) countries and the United Kingdom (UK).COVID-19 (Disease);Public health surveillance;Health--Testing

Guidance on the Provision of Support for Medically and Socially Vulnerable Populations in EU/EEA Countries and the United Kingdom During the COVID-19 Pandemic

From the Key Messages: [1] The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has had a huge and unprecedented impact on the EU/EEA [European Union/European Economic Area] and the UK, both in terms of morbidity and mortality, but also in social and economic terms. [2] Some individuals are much more vulnerable than the rest of the population, whether to COVID-19 itself, insofar as they are at elevated risk of severe disease and death, or to the consequences of the public health measures that have been imposed in order to control the spread of the virus, which have exacerbated their already challenging life situations. These people could be described as medically or socially vulnerable, respectively. [3] Many people have experienced both medical and social vulnerabilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, while others have faced a particularly extensive set of challenges due to their belonging to two or more recognised categories of social vulnerability. These challenges have included the need for targeted information, problems accessing services, de-prioritisation of routine services, stigma/discrimination, and legal as well as financial barriers.COVID-19 (Disease);Disaster recovery

Surveillance of COVID-19 at Long-Term Care Facilities in the EU/EEA

From the Introduction: The high COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] morbidity and mortality observed among residents in long-term care facilities (LTCF) in EU/EEA [European Union/European Economic Area] countries poses a major challenge for disease prevention and control in such settings. Furthermore, the lack of special surveillance systems and the differences in testing strategies and capacities among countries may have led to a significant under-ascertainment and under-reporting of cases, contributing to a general underestimation of the disease burden and mortality in LTCFs. One factor that may have contributed to the spread of COVID-19 within and between LTCFs relates to staff working while infectious, including symptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and asymptomatic cases. Other contributing factors may have been staff working in more than one facility, lack of personal protective equipment (PPE), lack of training and testing and testing being limited to symptomatic individuals. Limited testing may have played a disproportionate role in under-ascertaining cases among this population. The high prevalence of neurological conditions such as dementia and neuropathic disorders among LTCF residents may result in atypical COVID-19 clinical presentations or the absence of evident signs or symptoms until the patients' conditions deteriorate.COVID-19 (Disease);Infectious disease;Long-term care facilities